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Are immigration policies in European countries converging? Or do some countries remain 
more open to immigrants than others? We address these questions through an analysis of 
labour migration policies in five European countries from 1990 to 2016. Using an original 
immigration policy index (ImPol) to measure policy restrictiveness we examine whether 
policies have converged, to what extent immigration regimes reflect distinct ‘varieties of 
capitalism’, and whether national policy trajectories are shaped by domestic politics. We find 
little evidence of convergence; mixed evidence that immigration policy regimes reflect 
capitalist diversity; and strong evidence that policies respond to changes in domestic political 
conditions. Whilst ‘varieties of capitalism’ may set the broad parameters for immigration 
regimes, the direction and timing of policy changes are determined by domestic political 
competition. 








Are immigration policies in European countries converging? Or do some countries remain 
more open to immigrants than others? These questions are at the core of the literature on 
immigration policy. A central debate revolves around the extent to which immigration 
policies are determined by forces of economic globalization that are beyond governments’ 
control, or whether domestic-level political contestation better explains policy outputs. In this 
paper, we address these questions through an analysis of labour migration policy trends from 
1990 to 2015 in five European countries. Using an original immigration policy index (ImPol), 
which allows us to measure policy restrictiveness between countries and over time, we 
examine three hypotheses: first, that immigration policies have converged; second, that 
immigration regimes reflect distinct varieties of capitalism; and third, that cross-national 
variation and trajectories of policy change are shaped by domestic politics, specifically party 
competition and the mobilisation of ideas about immigration.  
 
Our approach combines quantitative analysis of policy outputs with qualitative case studies to 
examine policy changes at the country level. We first unpack, then examine, each hypothesis. 
We find little evidence of convergence. We then consider possible explanations for variation 
between countries and change over time within countries. First, we consider whether 
variation in policy across countries is conditioned by distinct varieties of capitalism. We find 
mixed evidence that immigration regimes reflect patterns of capitalist diversity.  Second, we 
present three country case studies, to explore whether policy changes over time are shaped by 
party politics and domestic debates about immigration. We find strong evidence that policies 
respond to changes in domestic political conditions. 
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Three approaches to immigration policy 
 
A key debate in the immigration policy literature concerns the extent to which policies vary 
across major destination countries, and in particular whether there is evidence of convergence 
in policy outputs. The idea of convergence relates both to the direction of travel on an open-
closed continuum (are policies converging on more or less restrictive approaches?), as well as 
in differences in the types of migrants that national regimes select (for example, is the 
relative openness towards higher and lower-skilled labour migrants increasingly similar 
across states, or are there persistent patterns of differentiation, some countries prioritising 
high-skilled, others low-skilled migrants?).  
 
We identify three approaches to these questions in the literature. The first contends that 
immigration policies in rich democracies are converging. For example, in Controlling 
Immigration, Hollifield et al. (2014) suggest that immigration policies across advanced 
economies are becoming increasingly similar. Although they do not specify the mechanisms 
behind convergence, their discussion points to economic globalization as a key factor pushing 
governments in similar directions. Facing similar economic pressures, rich countries are 
converging on more open labour migration policies. An alternative explanation of 
convergence looks not to external factors, but to endogenous processes in immigration 
policymaking in Western democracies. Freeman (1995) famously argued that immigration 
policymaking was shaped by ‘client politics’, which creates an ‘expansionary bias’ in labour 
migration policies across advanced economies. The politics of immigration in liberal 
democratic states ‘exhibit strong similarities that are broadly expansionist and inclusive’ 
despite anti-immigrant public preferences (Freeman 1995: 881). Whatever the drivers, recent 
research has provided some empirical support for the convergence hypothesis, finding 
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immigration policies in Western countries to have become increasingly liberal over the 
period 1980-2010 (Helbling and Kalkum 2018) and 1946-2013 (De Haas et al. 2018). As the 
literature offers diverse potential explanations, and moreover since empirical studies of 
convergence do not examine the factors behind it, we treat the convergence hypothesis as 
descriptive, rather than explanatory. 
 
A second school of thought contends that convergence is unlikely given the varied labour 
market structures and production strategies across advanced economies. Comparative 
political economists argue that immigration policies will tend to reflect distinct labour market 
configurations or patterns of employer demand. For example, Menz (2008) argues, contra 
Freeman (1995), that employers do not pursue more liberal immigration policies across the 
board. Instead, they lobby governments to open channels for migrant workers with particular 
skills and in certain sectors. According to Menz, the production strategy in a country will 
shape the types of firms and their preferences for labour and skills. 
 
This last point has received growing attention as scholars have begun to examine ‘the links 
between international migration and capitalist diversity’ (Afonso and Devitt 2016: 592; 
Devitt 2011; Paul 2016; Ruhs 2018). One approach draws on the varieties of capitalism 
(VoC) literature as developed by Hall and Soskice (2001). The core idea of VoC is that 
distinct capitalist models can be identified ‘based on the extent to which demand and supply 
are ‘embedded’ in social and political rules which constrain market forces’ (Afonso and 
Devitt 2016: 593). In their analysis of institutional differences and complementarities in a 
firm-based political economy, Hall and Soskice distinguished between liberal market 
economies (LMEs) found in the Anglo-Saxon world (US, UK, Australia) and the coordinated 
market economies (CMEs) of Germany, Japan, Sweden, and Austria. Other political 
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economists have argued for a third ideal-type – a hybrid Mixed Market Economy (MME) – to 
describe Southern European states such as Spain and Italy, and by some accounts France 
(Devitt 2011; Molina and Rhodes 2007). 
 
Given differences in the supply and demand for skills and labour with which these models are 
associated, VoC implies that firms’ demand for migrant workers will vary across the 
capitalist types. Labour market institutions, welfare systems, and education and training 
institutions should influence the domestic supply of labour and thus employer demand for 
migrant labour (Devitt 2011: 580); while the degree of coordination between political elites, 
firms, and trade unions, should condition the way in which policies are made (Menz 2008; 
Devitt 2011; Ruhs 2018; Paul 2016; Afonso and Devitt 2016). This suggests that immigration 
policy will reflect the institutional differences of LMEs, CMEs and MMEs. We unpack these 
differences below, but in brief we expect that LMEs will be relatively open towards both 
high- and low-skilled migration, whereas CMEs should be open only to high-skilled and 
relatively closed to low-skilled migrants. MMEs exhibit a mix of logics and a high degree of 
institutional incoherence, making it more difficult to derive expectations. Nonetheless, for 
reasons we explain below, we expect MMEs to be open to low-skilled migration, particularly 
agricultural workers. 
 
In contrast to accounts which view immigration policies as structured by national political 
economies, a third approach views policy as strongly shaped by domestic politics. Scholars 
who argue that immigration policy is shaped by shifting and often unstable changes in 
domestic politics are sceptical that exogenous processes of globalization are driving 
convergence and political economy approaches that emphasise structural explanations. Two 
implications of this approach are: firstly, that immigration policies are likely to fluctuate over 
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time, evolving in more or less restrictive directions depending on political competition about 
immigration; and secondly, that policies are unlikely to exhibit consistent patterns of cross-
national variation grounded in stable models of political economy. 
 
Several scholars argue that political parties matter in shaping immigration policy, for 
example whether centre-left or centre-right parties are in government (Schain 2008; 
Hampshire and Bale 2015), or whether successful radical right parties are able to exert direct 
or indirect effects on policy (Norris 2005); others point to the role of historically embedded 
ideas and public debates in immigration policymaking (Boswell and Hampshire 2017; 
Consterdine 2018; Hansen 2000). According to these accounts, there is little reason to believe 
that policies will converge, nor that they will straightforwardly reflect institutional 
differences in national production strategies; rather, the ebb and flow of domestic politics will 
shape policy outputs. Volatility, rather than convergence or stable cross-national variation, is 
to be expected.  
 
In summary, the three approaches sketched above generate different expectations about 
immigration policies. The first hypothesises that policies are converging, whether as a result 
of exogenous constraints associated with globalization, or structural similarities endogenous 
to immigration policymaking in Western democracies. By contrast, comparative political 
economists predict patterned variation in immigration policies that reflect the institutional 
differences and complementarities across advanced capitalist economies. Liberal, 
coordinated, and mixed market economies should exhibit relatively stable differences in 
terms of their openness towards higher and lower-skilled migrant workers. Finally, a third 
approach analyses immigration policy as the product of domestic political processes. In 
contrast to both the convergence and patterned divergence hypotheses, policy is more likely 
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to respond to changes in the composition of governments, the success of anti-immigrant 
parties, and the framing of immigration in public debates.  
 
We examine to what extent trends in immigration policies across five European countries – 
France, Germany, Italy, Spain, and the United Kingdom (UK) – during the period 1990 to 
2016 bear out these contrasting expectations. Is immigration policy in these countries 
characterised by convergence, patterned variation, or political volatility? To address this 
question, we utilise a new immigration policy index, which allows us to make systematic 




Our analysis is based on an original dataset and immigration policy index (ImPol), which 
systematically measures the restrictiveness of immigration policies in five European 
countries during 1990-2016. ImPol enables analysis of cross-national variations between 
countries, as well as change over time. ImPol is designed to capture changes in labour 
migration policies at different levels of aggregation, allowing the examination of work-
related routes by occupations or skill level, which is important since entry criteria and 
conditions attached to admission are often differentiated depending on the job, education or 
skills of migrants (Ruhs 2018). 
 
This distinguishes ImPol from other immigration policy indexes such as IMPIC (Helbling et 
al. 2017), IMPALA (Beine et al. 2016), DEMIG (De Haas et al. 2018) and Ruhs’s labour 
migration index (2018). Most of these indexes treat labour migration as a homogenous 
category, without the differentiations afforded by ImPol. The exception is Ruhs’ index, which 
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does distinguish between low- and high-skill migration, but is limited to a single year (2009). 
Our indicators for labour migration, coupled with a unique ‘by-occupation’ approach (see 
below), means that ImPol provides the most advanced measure to date of labour migration 
policy. 
 
The first conceptual question for any measurement of policy restrictiveness is how to capture 
the complex and multidimensional nature of immigration policy itself (Helbling et al. 2017). 
What do we mean when we say immigration policy is more or less restrictive? Which 
instruments are we measuring and how can this be operationalised? ImPol measures 
restrictiveness in two dimensions: entry criteria (whether policy makes admission to a 
country easier or harder through more or less stringent eligibility requirements); and 
conditions attached to admission (whether policy grants more or less generous conditions to 
migrants after they are admitted). Examples of entry criteria include language, age, and job 
offer requirements; examples of conditions attached to admission include rights for 
accompanying family members, the possibility to transition visas, and routes to settlement. 
We do not include in-country rights that are affected by non-immigration policies and 
institutions, for example healthcare, education or social security rights, as this would 
confound cross-national comparisons of immigration policy per se. 
 
ImPol uses a total of 24 indicators for labour migration: 12 for entry criteria, and 12 for 
conditions attached to admission. Each indicator is measured using an ordinal scale, with 
three options: restrictive (‐1), neutral (0), and open (1). The codebook sets thresholds for 
coding decisions using objective criteria. For example, if a language requirement is set at B1 
or above on the Common European Framework of References for Language then this route is 
coded as -1, a requirement at a lower level is coded 0, whereas no language requirement is 
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coded 1. This approach to thresholds means that ImPol not only captures changes in 
restrictiveness over time for a given country, but also enables systematic comparison across 
countries. Each indicator is coded for every year in the time series. In our analysis below, we 
aggregate entry criteria and conditions attached to admission as states use both to regulate 
work migration. Scores are averaged with equal weighting for each indicator. 
 
An innovative feature of ImPol is the ‘by occupation’ approach. This approach is our solution 
to a methodological problem presented by the complexity of policies regulating the entry and 
stay of work migrants. Labour migration policies are highly, and often increasingly, 
differentiated, and their structure varies considerably across different national policy regimes. 
In most countries, there is not a single route or set of criteria for migrant workers, but many 
different visas and routes, each with different entry criteria and conditions attached to 
admission, depending on factors such as the applicant’s education and skills, whether they 
have a job offer, and if so, what sector that job is in. Indeed, ‘labour migration policy’ is 
really shorthand for myriad policies operating within a national framework. 
 
This creates significant challenges for consistent and reliable measurement, especially across 
countries and time. It is not possible simply to measure visas, since comparable visas do not 
exist in all countries. For example, not all countries operate a visa for ‘high-skilled’ workers 
distinct from other work visas, yet there will usually be some entry route for those who would 
be considered high-skilled. Even within a given country it is not always possible to track a 
single visa, since categories are created, amalgamated, and abolished over time. 
 
To overcome this problem, we measure work-related migration policies using selected 
occupations at different skill levels as defined by the International Labour Organization’s 
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International Standard Classification of Occupations (ISCO-08). For each occupation we 
code the visa or programme that applies to that occupation or, where there is no dedicated 
visa or programme, we code the ‘general route’ (see below). This allows us to track changes 
in entry criteria and conditions attached to admission for a given occupation over time and 
across countries, even when the applicable visa category for that occupation changes over 
time or is different across countries. For low-mid skilled routes we coded agricultural 
labourers, construction labourers, teachers’ aides, and au pairs. For high-skilled routes we 
coded doctors, researchers, software developers, and managing directors. This approach 
allows us to analyse policies on specific occupations between countries and over time; and by 
aggregating occupations at different skill levels we can produce measures of restrictiveness 
towards selected higher- and lower-skilled workers. We also measure what we call the 
‘general route’, which is a construct to capture the main route for work visas in the absence 
of specific occupational programmes. This is often numerically the most significant route. 
 
Once the coding scheme was agreed, the coders compiled a database of legal texts for each of 
the five countries. For some indicators, coding could be completed with reference to primary 
legislation, but since the details of entry criteria and conditions attached to admission are 
often specified only in lower-level rules, coders often had to consult secondary legislation, 
decrees, circulars, internal instructions, etc. To verify our coding, we interviewed 
immigration officials (especially where lower-level instructions were unavailable), and expert 
lawyers were consulted to confirm coding decisions in each state. 
 
The convergence hypothesis 
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To examine whether policies are converging we begin with the ‘general route’ across our five 
states. This represents the primary entry channel for work-related migration and is the default 
work visa in the absence of occupational or sector-specific routes. If the convergence 
hypothesis is correct, we should see evidence of the general route converging over the last 25 
years. 
 
Figure 1 (see the online appendix) presents results for the general route. It provides at best 
mixed evidence that these European states’ work migration routes have converged. The range 
has reduced from 0.48 in 1990 to 0.32 in 2016, but there remains considerable variation 
between the five countries, and they have followed quite different trajectories: France and 
Germany are essentially stable (with minor restrictive adjustments in the mid-2000s); Spain 
has become considerably more open; Italy and the UK have become more restrictive. During 
the mid to late-2000s, four countries converged, but in 2012 Italy made a strong restrictive 
turn. The UK, which has the most restrictive approach of all five countries throughout the 
period, tightened its main work visa after 2010. The overall trend across the five countries is 
moderately restrictive: the mean ImPol score was 0.48 in 1990 compared to 0.40 in 2016. 
This hardly supports claims that functional pressures associated with economic globalization 
are sweeping countries in a more liberal direction.ii Furthermore, ImPol shows an overall 
restrictive trend since the 2008 crash, driven by tightening in Italy and the UK (cf Tilly 
2011). 
 
To further examine the convergence hypothesis, we next consider high-skilled routes. It is 
often argued that immigration policies have become increasingly selective (Helbling and 
Kalkum 2018: 1787), and migrants with specialised skills are sought by advanced economies 
in a ‘global race for talent’ as governments compete ‘to lure the best and the brightest’ 
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(Triadafilopoulos and Smith 2013). These migrants are enticed with attractive policy 
packages including facilitated entry and generous conditions, such as the right to bring 
dependents or a route to permanent settlement. 
 
Below we examine policies on high-skilled migration by aggregating all occupations defined 
as high-skilled within ImPol. As explained above, our bundle of high-skill occupations 
includes software developers, doctors, managing directors, and researchers. Figure 2 (see 
online appendix) presents the mean scores on all indicators for these occupations across our 
five countries. While the occupations are not a representative sample of high-skilled 
migration, they represent a numerically significant proportion of high-skill flows, and the 
results provide a good indicator of policy trends. 
 
As Figure 2 shows, we do not find evidence for convergence across high-skilled immigration 
policies, nor is there a clear trend towards more open policies. During the early to mid-2000s, 
all five countries loosened their entry criteria or conditions attached to admission for high-
skilled migrants. After 2008, however, they moved in different directions: Italy and 
especially the UK became more restrictive; Germany (post-2004 liberalization) and France 
remained relatively stable, while Spain became more open. 
 
We therefore find little evidence to support the idea of policy convergence on high-skilled 
migration. Instead, there is considerable cross-national variation by the end of 2016. While 
all countries liberalized high-skilled routes at some point between 1990 and 2005, since 2008 
they have followed different paths. If there was a ‘race for talent’ in the early 2000s, recently 
these European countries have been running in different directions.  
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Varieties of capitalism, patterns of immigration policy?  
 
We turn now to consider whether immigration policies are patterned according to varieties of 
capitalism (VoC). ImPol includes examples of each of the main VoCs: a LME (UK), a CME 
(Germany), and three MMEs (France, Italy, Spain). To date, there are no systematic analyses 
of whether policy outputs consistently vary between these VoC over time.iii 
 
We examine whether immigration policies are consistent with expectations derived from the 
literature about demand for labour migrants at different skill levels across the main VoC 
types. We do not make claims about political economy as an explanation of variation; rather 
our (more modest) aim is to test whether there is a good ‘fit’ between what the comparative 
political economy literature leads us to expect immigration policies should look like and 
policy restrictiveness at different skill levels across the three VoC types. 
 
The literature suggests that the deregulated labour markets of LMEs should be open to both 
low- and high-skilled migrants: employers in LMEs ‘seek easily transferable skills paired 
with flexible recruitment and redundancy strategies….[and] an abundant and flexible labour 
supply in lower skilled job markets’ (Paul 2016: 1632). We expect that firm lobbying for 
migrant workers will lead to comparatively expansive policies for low-skill migrants. At the 
same time, as LMEs are geared towards radical product innovation they will try to attract 
high-skilled migrants. This means that in LMEs we would expect to find policies that are 
expansive towards both high- and low-skill migrants.  
 
In contrast, CMEs adopt longer-term and more incremental production strategies, with firms 
investing in specialist and firm-specific skills through vocational training (Paul 2016: 1632). 
 14 
Employers ‘will lobby for skilled migrants who either complement existing production 
modes directly or provide valuable synergies if they permit the ‘import’ of skills that are not 
or not sufficiently generated domestically’ (Menz 2008: 5). The importance of collective 
bargaining in CMEs implies they will seek to ensure that migrants do not undermine wages 
and working conditions. CME employers will favour migrants that can address specific skills 
shortages, but ‘tend to exclude lower skilled admissions in order to avoid unwanted 
competition for jobs and excess migration’ (Paul 2016: 1632). Therefore, in CMEs we would 
not expect to see much demand for low-skilled migrant labour. Rather, CMEs should be 
mainly interested in high-skilled migrants. 
 
As MMEs exhibit a mix of logics, it is more difficult to derive expectations about their 
migration policies. The position of MMEs regarding high-skilled migrants, for example, is 
ambiguous. There is limited investment in training in MMEs compared to CMEs so we 
would expect to see skills shortages in the domestic workforce, leading to demands for high-
skilled migrants (Molina and Rhodes 2007: 16). However, MMEs also have polarized labour 
markets, with high levels of protection for permanent job-holders and barriers to the 
recognition of qualifications from other countries. We would therefore expect some 
encouragement of high-skilled migration, but at a much lower level than LMEs or CMEs, and 
only in specific sectors. At the other end of the labour market, there is a clearer picture. 
Given the low barriers to entry into their large, low-skill sectors we would expect to see a 
high level of demand for low-skill migrants in MMEs, on a par with LMEs and certainly 
higher than CMEs. In particular, in the MMEs of Southern Europe there should be high 
demand for migrant labour in the agricultural sector (Devitt 2011). 
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To consider whether these expectations are borne out, we use the measures of the general and 
high-skill routes (Figures 1 and 2 respectively) and also a measure of policy on low-skilled 
migrants. This latter measure uses the same methodology as high-skilled routes, except this 
time aggregating the lower skilled occupations: agricultural workers, construction laborers, 
teachers’ aides, and au pairs. These results are presented in Figure 3 (online appendix). 
 
What do the results in Figures 1-3 tell us? Beginning with the UK, the results do not fit our 
expectation that an LME should be open towards both high- and low-skilled migrants. Over 
the last three decades the UK has consistently had the most restrictive ‘general route’, and 
since 2008, the most restrictive policy for high-skilled migrants of all five countries (see 
Figures 1 and 2 online appendix). It is also far more restrictive than the other countries 
towards low-skilled migration, as shown in Figure 3. This is partly explained by the large 
number of European Union (EU) workers entering the UK labour market under free 
movement provisions, particularly since 2004 when eight Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) 
states acceded. But this does not explain the UK’s restrictive approach before 2004. Free 
movement is also arguably less plausible as an explanation of the UK’s restrictiveness on 
high-skilled migration. 
 
Germany fits the expectations of a CME more closely. Since the 1990s, it has a restrictive 
policy on low-skilled migration, as VoC predicts. Intra-EU mobility comprises a large 
proportion of migration to Germany, especially since the lifting of transitional controls on 
CEE states in 2011/14 (BPB 2018: 38; Clemens and Hart 2018). Germany’s high-skilled 
migration policy has been more volatile. During most of the 1990s and early 2000s, it had the 
most restrictive policy of all five countries, which does not conform to the expectation that a 
CME should be relatively open towards high-skilled migrants. In 2004, however, the federal 
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government liberalized its policy, and for the remainder of the period Germany was either the 
first or second most open country for high-skilled migrants. Thus, by 2016, Germany looks as 
a CME should do, with a clear discrepancy between a restrictive regime for the low-skilled 
and a relatively open regime for the high-skilled. The drivers of policy change during the 
period will be explored further below, but the fact that there was such an abrupt policy 
change in 2004 casts some doubt on the static institutional approach of VoC. 
 
France, Italy, and Spain are examples of MMEs (Molina and Rhodes 2007). As outlined 
above, the VoC literature on MMEs does not lead to clear expectations for high-skilled 
migrants and our findings show diverse patterns across the three countries (see Figure 2 
online appendix). ImPol results do support VoC-derived expectations about low-skilled 
migration, with Spain, Italy and France having the most liberal low-skilled immigration 
routes across the 26-year period, albeit with a clear restrictive trend in the case of Italy.   
 
One of the reasons Southern European MMEs should have open low-skill migration policy is 
the size of their agricultural sectors, which depend heavily on migrant labour. We therefore 
expect MMEs to have liberal policies towards agricultural workers in particular (though 
reliance on undocumented migration could potentially confound this expectation in ways 
similar to the effect of free movement in the UK). Figure 4 (online appendix) presents the 
results for agricultural routes. Our results broadly confirm our expectations: Italy persistently 
has the most liberal route over the period, despite a restrictive trend, and Spain has the second 
most liberal route for most of the period, with a liberalising trend. The anomaly is Germany, 
which is more open to agricultural workers than we expect a CME to be.  
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In summary, ImPol provides some support for VoC-derived policy patterns, but it is far from 
fully consistent with them. Low-skill immigration policies are broadly consistent, with 
Germany relatively restrictive, and Italy and Spain relatively open. The UK appears 
anomalous, but as explained above, this is probably a consequence of the significant number 
of EU workers from CEE states. On the other hand, our measures of high-skilled routes do 
not fit well with VoC: the UK is most restrictive, Germany only opens after 2004, and Spain 
became more open than both these countries following its 2013 reforms. Lastly, the high 
levels of volatility across most routes, and the contrasting trends in, for example, Italy and 




If there is little evidence of policy convergence across the five countries, and only partial 
evidence to support VoC-type patterns, can cross-national variation and changes over time be 
explained by political competition? We briefly examine the relationship between policy 
trends and party politics through case studies of three of our countries: UK, Germany and 
Italy. We identify party political competition, and the mobilisation of narratives about 
immigration by political parties, which often draw on national experiences, as explanatory 
factors for policy change in our three cases. Here we follow Ruhs’ argument that ‘qualitative 
research and in-depth case studies are critical to gaining a better understanding of the 
relationships and dynamics between migration policies and other types of public policies and 
institutions’ (2018: 27). 
 
Immigration policy in the UK has become more restrictive across high-skill, low-skill, and 
general routes (see Figure 5 online appendix). During the 1990s and the first half of the 
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2000s, the UK operated one of the most liberal policies on high-skilled migration, through 
the Highly Skilled Migrant Programme and then Tier 1 (General) of the PBS, which allowed 
high-skilled migrants to enter the UK without a job offer. This route was tightened in 2008 
and then, in 2010, closed altogether. Since then, only the smaller entrepreneur and investor 
schemes operate under Tier 1, both with stringent entry requirements. The general route, 
which in the UK refers to the work permit scheme for workers with a job offer (since 2008, 
Tier 2), followed a similar trend. Finally, the few low-skill routes for non-EU nationals have 
been closed down altogether. The route for low-skill work (Tier 3) has never been opened. 
The only significant scheme for manual work was the Seasonal Agricultural Workers Scheme 
(SAWS), which closed to non-EU nationals in 2008. The only other low-skill route was the 
au pair visa – which involved small numbers of applicants and was terminated in 2008. 
Unlike other EU countries, the UK has never operated a scheme for construction workers. 
  
A liberalisation of immigration policy occurred under the Labour Governments in the early 
2000s (Consterdine 2018). As Figure 5 shows, the liberalisation of entry criteria was in fact 
fairly modest. What was perhaps more significant was Labour’s discourse about immigration, 
and its decision not to impose transitional controls on citizens from the newly acceded CEE 
states in 2004. New Labour’s immigration discourse framed labour migration as an essential 
part of an open economy and society (discourse and policy on asylum was, by contrast, 
highly restrictive). Tony Blair, and several of his ministers, made high profile speeches 
extolling the economic and cultural benefits of immigration, depicting migration as an 
inevitable and desirable aspect of globalisation (Boswell and Hampshire 2016). 
 
New Labour’s discursive shift soon met with a political backlash. Right-wing tabloid 
newspapers carried sensationalist headlines on immigration and the Conservatives attacked 
 19 
Labour’s immigration record in the 2005 election. Under Nigel Farage, the United Kingdom 
Independence Party (UKIP), began to campaign on an anti-immigration platform, threatening 
to take votes from the Conservatives, and also disgruntled Labour voters. As public opinion 
polls revealed negative attitudes and increased salience (Ipsos Mori 2007), the new Labour 
leader, Gordon Brown, tried to fight a rear-guard action, tightening policy and adopting a 
nationalistic discourse, famously captured in his 2007 conference speech pledge to create 
‘British jobs for British workers’.  
 
In the 2010 general election campaign, the Conservatives exploited Brown’s vulnerability on 
immigration by committing to reduce net migration ‘from hundreds to tens of thousands.’ 
After the Conservatives formed a Coalition Government with the Liberal Democrats, the net 
migration target drove a raft of restrictive policy changes to tighten entry criteria and reduce 
inflows (Hampshire and Bale 2015): Tier 1 was closed, criteria for Tier 2 were made more 
stringent, and a monthly quota for work permits was introduced.  
 
The UK starkly illustrates how immigration policy change can be driven – rapidly and 
substantially – by the dynamics of party competition. Policy tightening began with Gordon 
Brown’s attempt to mitigate the electoral risk of Labour’s openness towards work migration 
and was then extended by the Conservative’s political gambit in announcing a net migration 
target. 
 
Italy has also seen a restrictive trend, with all three routes scoring lower on the ImPol index 
by 2015 than in the early 1990s (see Figure 6 online appendix). Italy only became a country 
of net immigration in the 1980s. It has a relatively immature immigration system 
characterized by ‘weak statism’ (Zincone and Caponio 2005: 7). For much of the last three 
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decades, restrictive political discourse has co-existed with tacit permissiveness towards 
irregular migration, and the frequent use of sanatorie – large-scale regularization 
programmes, such as the 1995 Dini Decree, which regularized nearly 250,000 migrants. 
 
Immigration legislation dating from the 1980s did not provide an effective regulatory 
framework for labour migration. In 1998, the Turco-Napolitano Act introduced a requirement 
that labour migrants needed a formal job offer from a sponsoring employer, and created a 
one-year job seekers residence permit, which converted the residence rights of many visas 
from permanent to temporary. Turco-Napolitano was subject to continuous bargaining 
between political actors (Zincone and Caponio 2005: 9), with the centre-left coalition 
government forced to accept amendments from its left-wing, while pursuing a restrictive 
course in the face of electoral threats from the increasingly anti-immigrant Lega Nord.   
 
In the run up to the 2001 general election, Silvio Berlusconi’s right-wing coalition, Casa 
delle Libertà (CdL), which included the Lega and the National Alliance (AN), attacked the 
supposed failings of the 1998 Act. The centre-left government attempted to defuse the issue 
by enacting a number of restrictive measures, including a 2000 circular that made it more 
difficult for migrants to obtain permanent residence, but the CdL won the 2001 election and 
moved to enact new, restrictive legislation.  
 
The 2002 Bossi-Fini Act, named after the leaders of the Lega and AN, introduced a number 
of harsh measures on irregular immigration, as well as tougher provisions on regular 
migration, including a unified contract of residence and employment, which tied legal 
residence to a work contract, and set limits on renewals for residence permits. Contentious 
wrangling in a divided parliament shaped the Act and the drafting itself was ‘accompanied by 
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strong internal conflicts within the governing coalition’ (Zincone 2006: 364). The 
government’s electoral promises to clamp down on irregular migration proved to be ‘a 
political boomerang’ (Zincone 2006: 362) as the proposed deportation of irregular migrant 
workers threatened small businesses in electoral strongholds of both the AN and Lega Nord. 
In response, provisions for further regularisations were incorporated into the bill. Like the 
1998 Act, the Bossi-Fini Law was a patchwork bill shaped by compromises needed to hold 
together a fissiparous coalition (Zincone and Caponio 2005: 10-11). 
 
Some of the restrictive measures in Bossi-Fini caused such problems that the government 
later watered them down. For example, due to the tightening of renewal conditions, 
immigrants were compelled to leave the country temporarily in order to renew their 
application on their return. The government responded by increasing the renewal period for 
seasonal permits to three years. Amidst the overall restrictive trend, there was some 
liberalization for high-skilled migrants. Whilst annual quotas were in place for work permits, 
some high-skilled occupations were exempted, meaning holders could enter and work in Italy 
in unlimited numbers, albeit on a temporary permit. In 2004, the Government approved the 
Decree 18 n.334 that erased the temporary element of the Casi Particolari (high skilled), and 
allowed for a route to permanency.  
 
Immigration was was an issue of political contention through the late 2000s. Policy responses 
to the financial crisis and its aftermath continued the restrictive trend started by the 2002 
Bossi-Fini law (Caponio and Cappiali 2018: 117). The annual migrant quotas were 
considerably reduced and the majority of permits were offered only to a small number of 
nationalities. Two further regularisations were launched in 2009 and 2012, although the 
criteria were far more selective than previous programmes. 
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In summary, the restrictive direction of Italy’s immigration policy since the 1990s was 
shaped by party competition over immigration, especially the rise of anti-immigrant parties, 
tempered to some extent by the practicalities of governing a country with a large irregular 
migrant labour force. Restrictive shifts in policy were the product of fragmented coalition 
politics, where brokering and compromise are the norm: lobbying by advocacy coalitions has 
occasionally resulted in liberal concessions, but the overall direction of travel has been 
restrictive, strongly influenced by the Lega’s influence when in government and their 
contagion effect on other parties. 
 
Immigration policy in Germany has been relatively stable for most of the period under 
analysis, with one dramatic exception. The ImPol index shows that the general and low-
skilled routes have remained largely unchanged over three decades (see Figure 7 online 
appendix). Only the high-skilled route has undergone substantial change, in 2004. The 
relative stability of German immigration policy is not altogether surprising given the more 
consensual decision-making processes of the German legislative system, compared to single-
party majoritarian governments in the UK or unstable coalitions in Italy. 
 
There is, however, a more specific reason for immigration policy stability, which points to 
the importance of national historical legacies, and their mobilisation by political parties in 
debates about immigration. During the post-war years, Germany recruited thousands of 
migrant workers as Gastarbeiter or guestworkers (Martin 2014). When many of these 
migrants decided to stay in Germany rather than return to their countries of origin, the 
guestworker scheme was widely described as a policy failure. After the recruitment stop in 
1973, Germany had a settled migrant community, and through family reunification, 
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continued arrivals of migrants. Despite this, during the 1980s politicians often denied that 
Germany was a country of immigration (Wir sind kein Einwanderungsland was a common 
refrain). This underpinned a restrictive citizenship regime, which denied access to German 
nationality not only to immigrants, but also to their children, and a refusal to debate 
immigration policy reform. With immigration largely off the public agenda, policy barely 
changed through the 1990s, though during this decade Social Democratic Party of Germany 
(SPD) and Greens did begin to question the kein Einwanderungsland paradigm and propose 
policy reforms (Ellermann 2015). As Boswell and Hampshire (2015) argue, a distinctive 
national ‘public philosophy’ was crucial to understanding immigration policymaking in 
Germany. 
 
The only significant policy liberalisation of the entire period had its origins in the Schröder 
government’s proposal in early 2000 to create a new programme to recruit foreign IT 
workers. This ‘Green Card’ scheme was modest: it was sector-specific and allowed for the 
admission of only 20,000 workers per year who would be admitted on strictly time-limited 
five-year visas. Despite the relatively small scale and temporary nature of the permits, the 
scheme was opposed by the opposition − Christian Democratic Union (CDU) and Christian 
Social Union (CSU) −, who invoked the ‘failure’ of the post-war guestworker programme 
and the supposed inability of German society to accommodate immigrants. At the same time, 
the opposition Free Democratic Party and the SPD’s own coalition partners, the Greens, 
demanded more radical reform of the immigration system. Caught in the crossfire, the SPD 
interior minister, Otto Schily, established an immigration commission in the hope that it 
would provide technocratic support for policy liberalisation. The Süssmuth Commission’s 
report, published in July 2001, opened with the statement ‘Germany needs immigrants’ and 
went on to recommend work permits for foreign graduates and the introduction of a points 
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system for skilled migrants. These recommendations were put into draft legislation, which 
after heated debate passed through the Bundestag, but were then narrowly defeated in the 
Bundesrat. The recommendations of the Süssmuth Commission were, however, gradually 
normalised in political debate, and in 2004 a new Immigration Law was passed, which 
introduced a high-skilled visa with a route to permanent settlement, breaking with all 
previous schemes’ insistence on temporariness (Ellermann 2015; Green and Danielson 2004). 
 
This brief case study illustrates how Germany’s comparatively stable policy and the 
liberalisation of the high-skilled route in 2004 can only be understood with reference to 
contestation between the SPD-Green governments and the CDU-CSU opposition over the 
legacy of Germany’s guestworker experience. Mobilisation of this legacy was central to the 
CDU-CSU’s resistance to immigration policy liberalisation, which was overcome only once, 
and only for high-skilled migrants, via the recommendations of a commission which 




In this paper we have examined three hypotheses about immigration policies: first, that 
immigration policies are converging; second, that they are conditioned by varieties of 
capitalism; and third, that they are shaped by party competition in national politics. Our 
analysis does not support the claim that immigration policies have converged since the 1990s, 
nor do we find evidence of liberalisation over time. Using the ImPol index, we examined 
policy trends across the general, high-skilled, and low-skilled routes: since the 1990s, the 
range of policy variation has narrowed on the general route, but this is largely a function of 
Italy’s restrictive trend, and despite this, by 2015 there remained considerable variation 
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between the five countries; high-skilled routes converged during the early 2000s, but since 
the financial crisis countries have followed different paths, some tightening, others relaxing 
policy in an attempt to entice high-skilled workers to stimulate economic growth. Since the 
financial crisis of 2008 the overall direction of travel in these five countries has been one of 
stability or restriction. 
 
Our analysis provides some support for the idea that immigration policies reflect patterns of 
capitalist diversity. The VoC literature leads us to expect that distinct policy regimes should 
emerge in liberal, coordinated, and mixed market economies: LMEs should be open to both 
high and low-skilled migrant workers; CMEs open to high, but closed to low-skilled; and 
MMEs open to low-skilled. Low-skill immigration policies are broadly consistent with these 
expectations. As a CME, Germany is relatively restrictive, while the three MMEs are 
relatively open. The UK appears anomalous, but in fact receives a large number of migrant 
workers into lower-skilled jobs through free movement of CEE citizens. High-skilled routes, 
however, do not fit well with VoC: the UK, which should be open, is the most restrictive, 
Germany only opened after 2004, and Spain after 2013 is more open than both these 
countries. Furthermore, the number and extent of policy changes within the five countries 
raises doubts about whether their immigration policies reflect stable institutional differences. 
 
Indeed, we find evidence of policy changes that can only be understood by paying attention 
to party politics and national debates in individual countries.iv Immigration policies move 
sometimes in a liberal, sometimes a restrictive direction, and their course is set by national-
level political conflict. Through three case studies we have shown how policy changes in 
Germany, Italy and the UK were shaped by party competition: the UK’s immigration regime 
was opened and then closed under different governments, as a direct result of intensified 
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competition on immigration; Italy’s restrictive trend was influenced by the rise of anti-
immigrant parties in the context of a relatively immature immigration regime; while 
Germany’s policy stability and its moment of liberalisation was shaped by contestation over 
the legacy of its post-war guestworker scheme. In short, while VoC may set the broad 
parameters for immigration regimes, both the direction and timing of policy changes are 
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i  For methodological details including coding scheme of ImPol see Consterdine and 
Hampshire (2016). 
ii We ran separate tests using only entry conditions to verify our results for general, low-
skilled and high-skilled, and the results of the separated and aggregate analyses correspond 
with one another. We do find moderate convergence on conditions attached to admission on 
the general route, especially in the mid-2000s (likely due to implementation of the 2003 
European Long Term Residents’ Directive). However, there is little convergence on entry 
criteria. 
iii Devitt (2011) examines capitalist diversity and migration, but focuses on labour migration 
flows rather than policy. Paul (2016) examines VoC and policy outputs, but her analysis is 
limited to a comparison of Britain and Germany. Ruhs (2018) covers more countries, but 
only for a single year (2009) and tests only temporary labour migration programmes for each 
country.  
iv Our analysis has considered only labour migration policies, which, in contrast to other 
migration streams such as family or humanitarian forms of migration, are discretionary and 
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